A simple and secure way to show the validity of your public key by Graaf, J.A.M. (Jeroen) van de & Peralta, R.
A Simple and Secure Way to Show the VaHdity of Your 
Pub] i c Key_._ 
Jeroen van de Graaf 
Centrum voor Wiskunde en lnformatica 
Amsterdam 
Rene Peralta 
Facultad de Matematicas 
Universidad Cat61ica de Chile 
ABSTRACT 
We present a protocol for convincing an opponent that an integer N is of the form 
Pros, with P and Q primes congruent to 3 modulo 4 and with rand s odd. Our protocol is 
provably secure in the sense that it does not reveal the factors of N. The protocol is very 
fast and therefore can be used in practice. 
I. Introduction. 
Many protocols in the literature assume that the parties involved have previously 
agreed that their respective public keys are Blum integers. That is, composites of the 
form N = Pr 05 , with P and o primes congruent to 3 modulo 4 and with r and s odd. This 
agreement must of course be achieved through a protocol which does not compromise the 
secrecy of the keys. 
Blum integers are characterized by the following three conditions: 
i) N"" 1 mod 4. 
ii) There exists a quadratic residue modulo N with square roots with opposite 
Jacobi symbol. 
iii) N has at most two prime factors. 
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There is no known efficient algorithm to verify conditions ii) and iii). Interactive 
protocols are used for this purpose: A convinces B that ii) and iii) hold. The protocol for 
verifying condition ii), due to Manuel Blum [Blum82], requires the interchange of roughly 
100 integers modulo N, and thus is very fast. The bottleneck in the pub I ished protocols 
(see [BKP85] [GHY85] ) is in showing that N has exactly two distinct prime factors. The 
protocols are based on an observation due to Adleman. He suggested using the fact that if 
N has exactly two prime factors then 1 /4 of the elements of ZN* are quadratic residues. 
If N has more than two prime factors then at most 1/8 of the elements of ZN* are 
quadratic residues. Thus, a binomial experiment can be used to distinguish between the 
two cases. Ommiting details, the standard solution is to jointly generate M random 
numbers in ZN* with Jacobi symbol + 1 and have the owner of the public key N produce 
square roots modulo N for approximately half of the numbers. In [BKP85] it is shown that 
the error probability is minimized by having the prover show square roots for a fraction 
(./2i - 1 )/20 of the M numbers, giving a probability of error asymptotically bounded by 
e -(M/75) above and e -(M/74) below. Thus M must be in the thousands in order to achieve 
truly negligible probability of error. An additional undesirable property of this solution is 
that the error is two-sided. It is possible that A may fail to convince B that N has exactly 
two prime factors when in fact it does, and it is possible that A can convince B that N has 
exactly two prime factors when in fact it doesn't. 
We present a much raster protocol that solves this problem and which has only one-
sided error probability: with exponentially small probability, A can convince B that N has 
exactly two prime factors when in fact it has more. 
We assume the existence of a mutually trusted source of random bits. This imposes 
no restriction on our protocol since any of a number of cryptographic techniques can be 
used to generate mutually trusted random bits. 
In the next section we recall the number theoretic definitions and theorems needed 
for the protocol. Section 3 gives the actual protocol, together with a proofs of 
correctness and security. 
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2. Number Theoretic Background. 
We denote by ZN*(<-1) the set of elements in ZN* with Jacobi symbol + 1. If N is a 
Blum integer then N"' 1 mod 4. This implies the Jacobi symbol modulo N of -1 is+ 1, a fact 
we wi 11 use. We assume B checks that N "" 1 mod 4 , not a square and not a power of a 
prime. 
Thesetofn-tuplesSn= { (1,-1}n} endowed with ordinary component-wise integer 
multiplication is a group with identity 1 = (1, ... ,1). Let P/1P/2···pnm be the 
factorization of N with the Pi's distinct primes. We define the function ON: ZN* ~ Sn as 
follows : the i'th component of ON(x) is 1 if x is a quadratic residue modulo Pi and -1 
otherwise. Notice that ON is a homomorphism with kernel the quadratic residues in ZN* . 
If P is a prime or the power of a prime then exactly half the elements of Zp* are 
quadratic residues. Thus, if x is random in ZN* then, by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, 
ON(x) is a random element of Sn. Notice also that if N is a Blum integer then 
ON(-1) = (-1,-1 ). 
If the prime powers appearing in the factorization of N all have odd exponents then 
we say N Is free or squares. Let N = vw with w the part of N which ls free of squares. 
That Is (V,W) = 1 • V is a square, and W is free of squares. Notice that w > 1 by 
assumption. Since V and N are congruent to 1 mod 4, it follows that W is congruent to 1 
mod 4. If x is a random element in ZN*(+ 1) then, by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, x mod 
V is a random element in Zv* (provided V > 1) and x mod W is a random element in 
Zw*(+ 1 ). From now on we denote by w the number of distinct prime factors of Wand by v 
the number of distinct prime factors of V. Since w"" I mod 4 and free of squares. It 
follows that an even number of prime factors of W is congruent to 3 mod 4. This implies 
that OwC-1) has an even (possibly 0) number of negative entries. Another number-theory 
fact we will use is that a random number x in Zw*(+ I) has probability ( 1 /2)w-l of being 
a quadratic residue. Similarly, a random number x in Zv* has probability ( 1 /2) v of being a 
quadratic residue. It follows, by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, that a random number x 
in ZN*(+l) has probability (1/2)v+w-t of being a quadratic residue. If x is random in 
ZN*(+l) and -1 E ZN*(+1) then -x is also a random element in ZN*(+I). Thus the 
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probability that at least one of x or -x is a quadratic residue is less than or equal to 
v+w-1 Y+w-2 
2( l /2) = ( 1 /2) We have shown the fol lowing theorem: 
Theorem I: Suppose N .. 1 modulo 4 and has more than two d1sttnct prime factors. If x Is 
a random element in ZN*(+ 1) then the probability that at least one of x or -x is a 
quadratic residue modulo N is less than or equal to ( 1 /2). 
Another class of numbers will appear throughout this paper. These are composites 
of the form N = P2r 08 with P and Q prime, P .. 3 mod 4, a"' I mod 4, and s odd. For lack of 
a better name we call these numbers "class II" composites. 
Theorem 2: Suppose N is a Blum integer or of class 11. Let x be a random number in 
ZN*(+ 1 ). Then either x or -x is a quadratic residue modulo N. 
Proof: If N is a Blum integer then (JN(x) E [( 1, 1 ),(-1, - I)} . Thus x is not a quadratic residue 
if and only if O'N(x) = (-1,-1 ). But then ON(-x) = CJN(-1) ON(x) = (-1,-1) (-1,-1) = (1, 1) 
and so -x is a quadratic residue. 
If N is of class II then ON(-1) = (-1, 1) and ON(x) E {( 1, 1),(-1,1 )}. Thus if x is not a 
quadratic residue then ON(x) = (-1, 1) and so O'N(-x) =CJN(-1) ON(x) = (-1, 1)(-1,1) = ( 1, 1). 0 
Theorem 3: Assume N • 1 mod 4, N is not a square and not a power of a prime. Let x be a 
random element in ZN*(+l). If N is not a Blum integer and not a class II composite, then 
the probability p that one or both of x and -x are quadratic residues modulo N is less than 
or equal to ( 1 /2) . 
.eamr_: If N has more than 2 distinct prime factors then, by theorem 1, p :s: ( 1 /2). So 
we may assume N has exactly 2 prime factors Panda. 
If P .. a .. 3 mod 4 with N =Pros then, since N"' 1 mod 4, rand s must have the same 
parity. Since N is not a square it follows that r and s are odd and therefore N is a Blum 
integer. 
2r s If P"' 3 mod 4 and a .. 1 mod 4 then N must be of the form P a wtth s odd ( stnce 
N is not a square and 1s congruent to 1 mod 4 ) and therefore Is of class 11. 
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The only remaining case is when P .. a .. 1 mod 4. In this case x is a quadratic 
residue if and only if -x is a quadratic residue. If N is of the form P2r 05 with s odd then p 
= ( 1 /2) because x must be a quadratic residue modulo 08 but is random modulo P2r. 
Finally, if N is of the form Pr a6 with rand s odd, then O(x) is either ( 1, 1) or (-1, -1 ), each 
with equal probability. Therefore in this last case p is also ( 1 /2).a 
We will also need the following facts: 
lemma 1 : If N = Pr a8 is a Blum integer, x a quadratic residue modulo N, and b is 1 or -1, 
then x has a square root modulo N with Jacobi symbol b. 
£r.Qti.. By the Chinese Remainder theorem, ZN Is isomorphic to Zpr X Z 05 . Let 'I' be the 
isomorphism mapping ZN to Zpr X Za5 . Let u be a square root of x modulo N, and let \jl (U) 
-1 
=(a, p). Then v = \jl ((-a, p)) is also a square root of x modulo N. Recall that the Jacobi 
symbol of u modulo N is equal to the Jacobi symbol of o modulo Pr multiplied by the 
Jacobi symbol of p modulo as. Since Pr"' 3 mod 4, the Jacobi symbol of 01 and -a modulo 
Pr have opposite sign. Therefore u and v have opposite Jacobi symbol.a 
lemma 2 : Suppose N = P2r a8 is of class 11. Let x be a quadratic residue modulo N. Then 
all square roots of x modulo N have the same Jacobi symbol. 
£r.!t2.[. Using the notation of lemma 1 the four square roots of x are \jl- 1 ( (± o, ± p) ) 
for some 0t and p. Now +o and -a have Jacobi symbol 1 mod P2r, and +p and -p have the 
same Jacobi symbol modulo a8 since a"' I mod 4 Thus all square roots of x have the same 
Jacobi symbol.0 
J. How to Convince an Opponent that N is a Blum Integer. 
Assume N is not a square, not the power of a prime, and is congruent to 1 mod 4. 
The following protocol will convince B that N is a Blum integer. 
133 
PROTOCOL: 
( 1 ) A and B use the mutually trusted source of randomness to obta1n 100 
random numbers [xi : i =I , ... , I 00} in ZN*( +I) and I 00 random signs [bi : i =I , 
... , I 00} with bi E {I, -1 }. 
(2) for i = 1 to I 00 A displays a square root ri of xi or of -xi modulo N with 
Jacobi symbol equal to bi. 
Proof of correctness: If N is a Blum integer then, by theorem 2 and lemma 1, A can produce 
all the square roots required at step (2). If N is not a Blum integer or of class II then, by 
theorem 3, the probabi 1 ity that A can produce all the square roots required at step (2) is 
at most (1/2) 100. But if N is of class II then, by lemma 2, the probability that A can 
produce all the roots with the required Jacobi symbol is (112)100 Thus, unless N is a 
Blum integer, A will get caught cheating with probability 1 - ( 1/2)100.0 
proof of security: We must show that 1f N 1s a Blum Integer then no Information is 
released by A other than this fact. Not1ce that B simply observes the mutually trusted 
source of random bits and A's messages. In the terminology of [CEGP86], this is a verifler-
pass1ve protocol. It Is shown in [CEGP86] that to prove security of verifier-passive 
protocols we only need to produce a machine s. with input N a Blum integer, wh1ch can 
generate random bits and simulated messages which have the same joint probab11lty 
d1str1but1on as the mutually trusted random bits and the messages sent by A. The 
stmulator scan be constructed as follows: 
PROGRAM FOR SIMULATORS. 
i) Generate 100 random elements ri E ZN* {i = 1, ... , 100}. 
iO Let b1 be the Jacobi symbol of r1 modulo N. 
iii) For each i let xi = r? mod Nor xi = -<r?> mod N with equal probability. 
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It is a trivial matter to check that the ri's, the bi's, and the xi·s have the same joint 
probability distribution as those generated by A if A is honest.0 
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